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Abstract. When a society’s overall deprivation or living standard is as-
sessed in a multi-attribute framework, the following procedure is often used.
First, for each attribute, a summary index is constructed to reflect a society’s
performance in relation to this attribute. Then, an indicator of the overall
performance of the society in terms of all the attributes together is con-
structed. This paper discusses a difficulty associated with this procedure. We
show that the difficulty lies in its inability to reconcile two highly attractive
ethical principles - the first reflecting a requirement of treating individuals
symmetrically and the second reflecting a requirement for equity-sensitivity.
This problem implies that this widely-used procedure must lead to possibly
untenable conclusions, and that it is necessary to adopt alternative proce-
dures. The alternative procedure must permit describing a society’s overall
deprivation or living standard as an aggregate of the comprehensive depriva-
tions or living standards experienced by the individuals in the society.
JEL Classification Numbers: D0, D63, I32, O1
Keywords: deprivation, well being, living standards, equity, multiple
attributes, anonymity, invariance, human development index, human poverty
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1 Introduction
Over the last decade or so, economists have increasingly measured the de-
privation and living standards of societies in a multi-attribute framework.
There has been a growing realization that, while income-based measures of
deprivation and living standards are useful, they have important conceptual
limitations (see Sen 1985, 1987 for foundational statements of this criticism),
and, to overcome these limitations, one needs to think directly in terms
of other valuable attributes such as outcomes in (or the specific means to
achieve) health, education, housing, personal security, etc. Such thinking
underlies, for instance, the measurement exercises undertaken in the United
Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Reports, in which a
country’s achievement is assessed on the basis of measures of three attributes:
health, education, and real income per capita. For each of these three di-
mensions of ‘human development’, a summary index is constructed to reflect
a country’s performance in that dimension of human development. Based
on these three summary indices, an indicator of the overall achievement of
the country in terms of all the three dimensions (‘the Human Development
Index’) is constructed and countries of the world are then ranked on the
basis of this indicator. The UNDP’s Human Poverty Index, presented in
the same reports, is constructed in a similar way (although its focus is on
aggregate deprivations rather than achievements) and is also used to rank
countries. Many other analysts and institutions have produced rankings
of overall achievement (or deprivation) of populations (e.g. Morris (1979))
based on such a method, although the UNDP’s exercises are likely the best
known and most influential.
Analytically, these rankings are examples of a broad approach of the
following type. Given a set of attributes, the achievement or deprivation of
each individual in a group is measured for each of these attributes, so that,
for the group, we have a table or matrix of indices with each index in the table
indicating how well an individual is doing in terms of a specific attribute. An
overall indicator for the group is then constructed from the given table and is
used for comparing the living standards or deprivation levels of the group in
different situations. Owing to the nature of data available, the construction
of the overall indicator often uses the following strategy. First, for each
attribute, one establishes an index which summarizes how the individuals
are deemed to be doing in terms of this attribute. Next, one aggregates the
summary indices constructed in the first stage for different attributes so as
to derive an overall indicator of how the society is deemed to be doing in
terms of all the attributes taken together. An approach of this general kind
may seem to have the merit of being practical, especially if data concerning
the levels of living standards or deprivations experienced by members of the
group are only available from independent sources for each attribute.
In this paper, we address the following issue. How good is this seemingly
attractive way of arriving at an overall indicator of a society’s deprivation or
living standards? In particular, can the strategy outlined above yield satis-
factory overall indicators of the deprivation or living standards of groups? We
show that the answer to this question is essentially negative: in general, the
two-stage procedure that we have described above must fail to satisfy certain
highly plausible requirements.1 In much of our discussion, we shall focus on
the measurement of deprivation, but we shall indicate how the analysis can
1We are most grateful to Thomas Pogge for informing us that he had previously de-
scribed examples of the difficulty faced by a two-stage procedure in taking account of
equity concerns [see Pogge (1989, 2002)]. We demonstrate here that such examples are
instances of broader necessities.
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be readily extended to the measurement of living standards (see Section 6).
2 Notation and definitions
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a given finite set of individuals (n > 2) and let F =
{f1, . . . , fm} be a given finite set of attributes (m > 2). Let M = {1, ...,m}.
For every j ∈ M , let Rj be a non-empty set of real numbers; we assume
that #Rj > 2. Given our focus on the measurement of deprivation, we shall
assume that, for every j ∈ M, 0 ∈ Rj ⊆ [0, 1] and we shall interpret Rj as
the different levels of deprivation in terms of attribute fj that an individual
may possibly have, with 0 indicating the absence of any deprivation in terms
of the attribute under consideration ( while our main concern is with the
measurement of deprivation, in Section 6 we shall also consider other intuitive
interpretations of our framework with corresponding interpretations of the
numbers in Rj). For our purpose, it is enough to assume that the numbers
in Rj have an ordinal significance so that, if α, β ∈ Rj and α > β, then α
represents a higher level of deprivation in terms of attribute fj than β, but we
do not rule out the possibility of these numbers having cardinal significance.
The economy achieved by assuming no more than ordinal significance for the
different possible levels of deprivation for any attribute is important insofar as
deprivation may not be cardinally measurable in the case of many attributes
such as health.
Let (aij)n×m be an n×m matrix of real numbers such that, for all i ∈ N
and all j ∈M , aij ∈ Rj. For all i ∈ N and all j ∈M , aij will be interpreted
as the level of individual i’s deprivation in terms of attribute fj. We shall
refer to the matrix (aij)n×m as a deprivation matrix. The n ×m matrices
(aij)n×m, (a′ij)n×m, . . . , will be denoted by A,A
′, etc. The class of all such
n × m matrices will be denoted by V . For every A = (aij)n×m ∈ V and
every individual p, let ap• denote the row vector (ap1, . . . , apm), indicating
individual p’s deprivation levels in terms of the m attributes. Likewise, for
every A = (aij)n×m ∈ V and every attribute fj, let a•j denote the column
vector (a1j, . . . , anj), indicating each individual’s deprivation level in terms
of the attribute fj. Let A,A
′ ∈ V , i ∈ N , and j ∈ M . We say that ai• and
a′i• are j−variants if and only if aij 6= a′ij and aik = a′ik for all k ∈ M − {j},
that is, if and only if ai• and a′i• are identical except that aij 6= a′ij.
Let  be a reflexive (but not necessarily transitive or connected) binary
relation over V . We shall call such a binary relation an overall group depri-
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vation ranking (OGDR). For all A,A′ ∈ V,A  A′ denotes that the overall
deprivation of the group N in the social situation given by A is deemed at
least as high as the overall group deprivation in the social situation described
by A′. For all A,A′ ∈ V, [A  A′ iff (A  A′ and not(A′  A)] and [A ∼ A′
iff (A  A′ and A′  A)]. A  A′ indicates that the overall group deprivation
is deemed strictly greater in the social situation A than in the social situa-
tion A′, and A ∼ A′ indicates that the overall group deprivation is deemed
identical in the two social situations.
It may be noted that, in much of the literature on multi-dimensional de-
privation, the group deprivation measure specifies exactly one real number
(representing the level of overall group deprivation) for each deprivation ma-
trix. Of course, any such group deprivation measure induces an ordering
over V . Since our formal results are negative, in the interests of greater
generality we have chosen a framework in which the binary relation  over
V rather than the real numbers attached to different deprivation matrices is
the primitive concept. Our negative results proved for the binary relation
 will encompass, a fortiori, corresponding results for the case where, for
every A ∈ V, we have a real number representing the level of overall group
deprivation corresponding to A.
3 Anonymity and non-invariance
In this section, we shall consider some appealing properties which may be
imposed on an OGDR, , defined in the last section, and which are related
to the invariance of the OGDR to permutations of different kinds.
3.1 Anonymity concepts
Consider two deprivation matrices A and B such that A and B are identical
except that, for some two individuals s and t, s’s deprivation levels under
A are identical to t’s deprivation levels under B, and t’s deprivation levels
under A are identical to s’s deprivation levels under B; that is, as• = bt•,
at• = bs•, and ak• = bk• for all k 6= s, t. If one believes that all individuals
should be treated symmetrically, then one would find it appealing to require
that A and B, as specified above, should be associated with the same overall
group deprivation level. Formally, this property is captured by the following:
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Anonymity.  satisfies anonymity if and only if, for all A,B ∈ V and all
s, t ∈ N , if (ai• = bi• for all i ∈ N − {s, t}, as• = bt•, and at• = bs• ), then
A ∼ B.
Anonymity essentially requires that names of individuals should not play
any role in constructing an OGDR and an OGDR should be neutral with
respect to individuals’ names. Having said this, we note that anonymity
would not be a reasonable property to postulate for  if we want to build into
our measure any extra concern (beyond that already taken into account in the
assessment of their individual deprivation levels, registered in the deprivation
matrix) about the deprivation of specific subgroups in N , such as women,
ethnic minorities, people belonging to a lower caste, etc. In the absence of
any such special concern about any subgroup, however, the property seems
most reasonable and has been used extensively in the literature on poverty
and deprivation.
To conclude this subsection, we discuss a property related to Anonymity.
Consider two pairs of deprivation matrices (A, B) and (A′, B′) such that
A and A′ are identical and B and B′ are identical except that, for some
two individuals s and t, s’s deprivation levels under A are identical to t’s
deprivation levels under A′, and t’s deprivation levels under A are identical
to s’s deprivation levels under A′, and s’s deprivation levels under B are
identical to t’s deprivation levels under B′, and t’s deprivation levels under
B are identical to s’s deprivation levels under B′; that is, as• = a′t•, at• = a
′
s•,
bs• = b′t•, bt• = b′s•, and ak• = a′k• and bk• = b′k• for all k 6= s, t. If it is again
believed that all individuals should be treated symmetrically, then it would
be reasonable to require that the ranking between A and B must be identical
to the ranking between A′ and B′. Formally, this property is captured by
the following:
Invariance of Matrix Ranking to Permutations of Individuals. 
satisfies anonymity if and only if, for all A,B,A′, B′ ∈ V and all s, t ∈ N , if
(ai• = a′i•, bi• = b
′
i• for all i ∈ N − {s, t}, as• = a′t•, bs• = b′t•, at• = a′s• and
bt• = b′s•), then A  B ⇔ A′  B′.
It may be noted that, though conceptually Invariance of Matrix Rank-
ing to Permutations of Individuals is a stronger requirement on  than
Anonymity on , the two properties are logically independent if  is not
connected and transitive.
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3.2 Non-invariance and related properties
To motivate the next property of an OGDR, , we consider the following
simple situations. Let there be only two individuals, 1 and 2, and two at-
tributes, education(f1) and health (f2). Suppose, to start with, we have a
deprivation matrix A given below:
A =
(
1 0
0 1
)
so that individual 1 is deemed deprived in education but not in health, and
individual 2 is deemed deprived in health but not in education. Consider
now another situation in which individual 1 is deprived in both education
and health, and individual 2 is deprived in neither. The deprivation matrix
for this situation is given by the matrix B below:
B =
(
1 1
0 0
)
The fact that, in B, 1 has all the different types of deprivation in the society
while such deprivations are split between the two individuals in A could be
significant in comparing overall group deprivations represented by A and B:
it may be reasonable to say that A and B do not contain the same degree
of overall group deprivation. This is the basic idea of the next property,
non-invariance, that we introduce below:
Non-invariance.  satisfies non-invariance if and only if there exist A,B ∈
V, s, t ∈ N, and k ∈M , such that (a•j = b•j for all j ∈M − {k}), (aik = bik
for all i ∈ N − {s, t}), (ask = btk ), (atk = bsk), and (not(A ∼ B)).
Formally, non-invariance requires the existence of some deprivation ma-
trix A , some individuals s and t and some attribute fk such that, if, starting
with A, we interchange the deprivation levels of s and t with respect to
attribute fk in A, but keep everything else in A unchanged, then the new
deprivation matrix will have a different level of overall group deprivation as
compared to A.
To further our understanding of the intuition behind non-invariance, we
consider the following two other properties which are formally stronger than
non-invariance but have a more immediate intuitive appeal. First, consider
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a situation represented by the following deprivation matrix C with two indi-
viduals and three attributes:
C =
(
1 1 0
0 0 0
)
Note that, under C, individual 1 may be said to be unambiguously more
deprived than individual 2: individual 1 is more deprived than individual 2
in terms of each of attributes f1 and f2, and both individuals have the same
level of deprivation of attribute f3. Now, suppose that individual 1 becomes
even more deprived with an increase in 1’s deprivation in terms of attribute
f3 from 0 to 0.5 (1’s deprivation remains the same for attributes f1 and f2),
while individual 2’s deprivation levels for the three attributes remain the
same as under C. As a consequence, we have the situation represented by a
deprivation matrix D below:
D =
(
1 1 0.5
0 0 0
)
Next, suppose that, starting with C, individual 2, who is less deprived
than individual 1 under C, becomes more deprived in that 2’s deprivation
level for attribute f3 increases from 0 to 0.5, the same as 1’s deprivation level
for attribute f3 in D. This situation is illustrated by the deprivation matrix
E given below:
E =
(
1 1 0
0 0 0.5
)
Comparing D with E, there seem to be good reasons to conclude that the
overall group deprivation level under D is greater than the overall group
deprivation level under E: D is obtained from C by making a “poorer”
individual even more so while E is obtained from C by making a “richer”
individual poorer. Formally, we have the following:
Equity Principle I.  satisfies equity principle I if and only if, for all
A,B,C ∈ V , for all s, t ∈ N , and for all k ∈ M , if [(ai• = bi• = ci• for all
i ∈ N − {s, t}), (as• > at•, ask = atk, at• = bt•, and as• = cs•), and (as• and
bs• are k−variants, at• and ct• are k−variants, and bsk = ctk > ask = atk)],
then B  C.
Equity principle I is highly attractive when comparing overall group de-
privations. What it says is this. Suppose that we start with a deprivation
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matrix A where individual s is at least as deprived as individual t in terms
of every attribute and strictly more deprived in terms of some attribute, and,
further, in terms of some attribute k, s’s deprivation is the same as t’s depri-
vation. In this case, s can be considered to be unambiguously more deprived
than t. First, suppose, other things remaining the same in the matrix A, s’s
deprivation increases from ask to some higher level, say, α, and, as a result, A
changes to B. Next, suppose that, other things remaining the same in A, atk
increases to α and, as a result, A changes to C. Equity principle I requires
that the overall deprivation of the society be deemed higher in B than in C.
Equity principle I is an extension of a very familiar idea in the context of
measuring income poverty (where income is the only relevant dimension of
deprivation): if, to start with, there are two individuals who are both poor
but one of them is poorer than the other, then a reduction in the income
of the poorer person, other things remaining the same, will be considered to
give rise to a worse situation in terms of overall (group) poverty as compared
to an equal reduction in the income of the less poor person, other things
remaining the same.
To illustrate the intuition behind our second equity principle, we consider
a society with two individuals, 1 and 2, and three attributes, f1, f2 and f3.
Consider first a situation represented by the following deprivation matrix X:
X =
(
1 1 1
0 0 0
)
Note that, in X, individual 1 is deprived in terms of each attribute while
individual 2 is not deprived in terms of any attributes, so that individual
1 may be said to be unambiguously more deprived than individual 2. Now
assume that, as far as attributes f1 and f3 are concerned, there are no changes
in the deprivation of either individual, while, for attribute f2, there is a switch
of the two individual’s deprivation levels. The new situation is depicted by
the matrix Y below:
Y =
(
1 0 1
0 1 0
)
It seems reasonable to claim that the situation under X should be deemed
to involve a greater overall group deprivation level than the situation under
Y . The normative rationale for such a claim may be thought to be related
to that underpinning the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle in the literature
of income inequality or (more immediately) the ”prioritarian” principle de-
scribed in philosophical literature [see e.g. Parfit (1997); see also Anand
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(1983), Appendix E, for a demonstration that in the single attribute con-
text this principle is entailed by an ”egalitarian’ social welfare function]: the
“transfer” of an amount of deprivation of an attribute from a more deprived
individual to a less deprived individual should be deemed to reduce the overall
group deprivation level. Formally, this property is captured by the following
statement:
Equity Principle II.  satisfies equity principle II if and only if, for
all A,B ∈ V , for all s, t ∈ N, and for some k ∈ M , if [(ai• = bi• for
all i ∈ N − {s, t}) and (for all j ∈ M − {k}, asj = bsj > atj = btj and
ask = btk > atk = bsk)], then A  B.
To conclude this section, we note that an OGDR satisfying either equity
principle I or equity principle II must satisfy non-invariance (though the
converse is not true). Since both equity principle I and equity principle II
have much intuitive appeal, it is difficult to resist non-invariance (as that
would entail denying both equity principles simultaneously). .
4 Two-stage procedures for aggregating de-
privation matrices
We now consider two different procedures for deriving a binary relation 
over V , which we shall call the row-first two stage procedure and the column-
first two stage procedure respectively. Before introducing the formal defini-
tions of these two procedures, it may be helpful to consider a simple example
that illustrates the difference between the two procedures.
Example 1 Consider the case where N = {1, 2} and F = {f1, f2}.
What we call a row-first procedure will consist of two stages. In the
first stage we would use two (possibly identical) functions g1 and g2 (cor-
responding to the two individuals 1 and 2). For i = 1, 2, the functions gi
may be applied to any deprivation matrix A =
(
a11 a12
a21 a22
)
. gi (i = 1, 2)
will aggregate ai• = (ai1, ai2) to arrive at a real number αi which will in-
dicate the overall deprivation of the individual i in the social situation A.
Thus, corresponding to deprivation matrices A,A′, . . . , we would obtain vec-
tors (α1, α2) , (α
′
1, α
′
2) , . . . representing, for each social situation, the overall
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deprivations experienced by the individuals. The second stage is to rank those
different vectors, (α1, α2) , (α
′
1, α
′
2) , . . . , obtained from the first stage, so as
to produce a ranking, , of overall group deprivation experienced in different
social situations. The row-first approach embodies the idea (which may be
referred to as ’normative individualism’) that the deprivation attributed to
a society must be derived from (or possible to interpret as if it was derived
from) the deprivations attributed to individuals.
A column-first procedure will also consist of two stages. In the first
stage, we would use two functions h1 and h2 (now corresponding to the two
attributes f1 and f2). For j ∈ {1, 2}, the functions hj may be applied to
the deprivation matrix A above. hj(j = 1, 2) will aggregate a•j = (a1j, a2j)
to arrive at a real number βj. Thus corresponding to deprivation matrices
A,A′,... we would obtain vectors (β1, β2), (β′1, β
′
2), . . . ,. The second stage
is now to rank those different vectors, (β1, β2), (β
′
1, β
′
2), . . . ,obtained from the
first stage, so as to produce a ranking, , of overall group deprivation expe-
rienced in different social situations, as before.
More generally, but informally, a row-first two-stage procedure for deriv-
ing a ranking  over V proceeds in the following fashion: In the first stage we
use n functions gi : ×j∈MRj → R (i ∈ N), so as to produce, for each depri-
vation matrix A, an n-tuple of real numbers (g1(a1•), . . . , gn(an•)). For each
i ∈ N , let Gi = {α : α = gi(ai•) for some A ∈ V }. Let G = G1 × · · · × Gn.
For each i ∈ N , gi(ai•) can be interpreted as the level of i′s overall de-
privation in the social situation represented by A. Thus, the information
in each deprivation matrix is compressed to an n-tuple of real numbers
(g1(a1•), . . . , gn(an•)). One can call (g1(a1•), . . . , gn(an•)) the vector of overall
individual deprivations corresponding to A. In what constitutes the second
stage of the procedure, we rank the overall individual deprivation vectors cor-
responding to different deprivation matrices. This ”intermediate” ranking,
call it rcover G, is then used to induce a ranking  over V in the following
straightforward fashion:
for all A,A′ ∈ V,A  A′ if and only if (g1(a1•), . . . , gn(an•)) rc
(g1(a
′
1•), . . . , gn(an•)).
A column-first two stage procedure for deriving a ranking  over V is,
informally, as follows. In the first stage, we use m functions hj : (R
j)n → R
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(j ∈M) so as to arrive, for each deprivation matrix A, at an m-tuple of real
numbers: (h1(a•1), . . . , hm(a•m)). For every j ∈M, hj(a•j) can be thought of
as the society’s deprivation in terms of attribute j. Thus, the information in
the deprivation matrix A is compressed into a vector (h1(a•1), . . . , hm(a•m))
of real numbers. For each j ∈M , let Hj = {β : β = hj(a•j) for some A ∈ V }.
Let H = H1 × · · · ×Hm. In the second stage of the procedure we rank the
m-vectors (h1(a•1), . . . , hm(a•m)), (h1(a′•1), . . . , hm(a
′
•m)), etc. corresponding
to A,A′, . . . ∈ V . Letting cr denote this “intermediate” ranking over H,
the ranking of  over V is induced by the following rule:
for all A,A′ ∈ V,A  A′ if and only if (h1(a•1), . . . , hm(a•m)) cr
(h1(a
′
•1), . . . , hm(a
′
•m)).
We can now provide formal definitions of the two types of procedure. Let
 be a given reflexive and transitive binary relation defined over V . Then,
we define:
Row-first two-stage procedure: For every i ∈ N , let gi be a func-
tion from ×j∈MRj to R and let rc be a reflexive and transitive
relation defined overG. We say that can be derived through the
row-first two-stage procedure based on (g1, ..., gn;rc) if and only
if for all A,A′ ∈ V, [A  A′ if and only if (g1 (a1•) , ..., gn (an•)) rc
(g1 (a
′
1•) , ..., gn (an•))].
Column-first two-stage procedure: For every j ∈ M , let hj be
a function from (Rj)n to R, and let cr be a reflexive and
transitive relation defined over H. We say that  can be de-
rived through the column-first two-stage procedure based on
(h1, ..., hm;cr) if and only if for all A,A′ ∈ V, [A  A′ if and
only if (h1 (a
′
•1) , ..., hm (a
′
•m)) cr (h1 (a′•1) , ..., hm (a′•m))].
To conclude this section, we introduce two final concepts. Consider a
column-first two-stage procedure based on (h1, ..., hm;cr) . For all j ∈ M ,
we say that hj is symmetric iff if and only if, for every permutation σ over
{1, ..., n} and for all x, y ∈ [0, 1]n such that [xi = yσ(i) for all i ∈ N ], we
have hj(x) = hj(y); and we say that cris positively responsive if and only
if for all A,B ∈ V , if (h1(a•1), ..., hm(a•m)) > (h1(b•1), ..., hm(b•m)), then
(h1(a•1), ..., hm(a•m)) cr (h1(b•1), ..., hm(b•m)).
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5 Impossibility of deriving overall group de-
privation rankings with desirable proper-
ties through column-first two-stage proce-
dures
We have earlier argued that anonymity, non-invariance, equity principle I,
and equity principle II are independently attractive properties of an OGDR.
Suppose that we postulate some of these properties for our OGDR. Can
we derive such an OGDR through some ‘plausible’ two-stage column-first
procedure? We explore this issue in this section. As noted earlier, the issue
is important since two-stage column-first procedures are very frequently used
in applied research on multi-dimensional deprivation.
Proposition 1 Let  be a transitive overall group deprivation ranking,
which satisfies anonymity and non-invariance. Then  cannot be derived
through any column-first two-stage procedure based on (h1, ..., hm;cr) such
that, for every j ∈M, cr is positively responsive.
Proof. Suppose an OGDR  satisfies anonymity and non-invariance,
and can be derived through a column-first two stage procedure based on
(h1, . . . , hm;cr), where cr is positively responsive for every j ∈M . Then
we shall show that a contradiction follows. By non-invariance, there exist
A,B ∈ V , s, t ∈ N and j ∈ M such that [a•k = b•k for all k ∈ M − {j}],
[asj = btj, atj = bsj, and aij = bij for all i ∈ N − {s, t}], and [not(A ∼ B)].
Without loss of generality, let s = 1, t = 2, and j = 2. Then
A =

a11 a12 a13 · · · a1m
a21 a22 a23 · · · a2m
a31 a32 a33 · · · a3m
...
...
...
...
...
an1 an2 an3 · · · anm
 , B =

a11 a22 a13 · · · a1m
a21 a12 a23 · · · a2m
a31 a32 a33 · · · a3m
...
...
...
...
...
an1 an2 an3 · · · anm
 ,
and not(A ∼ B).
Note that,  can be derived through a column-first two stage
procedure based on (h1, . . . , hm;cr), where cr is positively re-
sponsive for every j ∈ M . From not(A ∼ B), we must have that
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not[(h1(a•1), h2(a•2), h3(a•3), . . . , hm(a•m)) ∼cr(h1(b•1), h2(b•2), h3(b•3), . . . , hm(b•m))].
Note that a•i = b•i for i = 1, 3, . . . ,m. Since (h1, . . . , hm;cr) is such that
cr is positively responsive for every j ∈ M and not(A ∼ B), it must be
true that h2(a•2) 6= h2(b•2). Since both h2(a•2) and h2(b•2) are real numbers,
it must be the case that either [h2(a•2) > h2(b•2)] or [h2(a•2) < h2(b•2)].
Without loss of generality, let [h2(a•2) > h2(b•2)]. Then, A  B by positive
responsiveness of cr.
Consider A′, B′ ∈ V such that
A′ =

a21 a22 a23 · · · a2m
a11 a12 a13 · · · a1m
a31 a32 a33 · · · a3m
...
...
...
...
...
an1 an2 an3 · · · anm
 , B′ =

a21 a12 a23 · · · a2m
a11 a22 a13 · · · a1m
a31 a32 a33 · · · a3m
...
...
...
...
...
an1 an2 an3 · · · anm
 ,
that is, A′ is obtained from A by interchanging the first two rows while
keeping all other rows unchanged, and B′ is obtained from B by interchanging
the first two rows while keeping all other rows intact. By anonymity, A′ ∼ A
and B′ ∼ B. A′  B′ now follows from the transitivity of  and A  B.
Note that  can be derived through a column-first two stage
procedure based on (h1, . . . , hm;cr), where cr is positively re-
sponsive for every j ∈ M . From A′  B′, we must have
(h1(a
′
•1), h2(a
′
•2), h3(a
′
•3), . . . , hm(a
′
•m)) cr(h1(b′•1), h2(b′•2), h3(b′•3), . . . , hm(b′•m)).
Note that a′•i = b
′
•i for i = 1, 3, . . . ,m. It then follows that h2(a
′
•2) > h2(b
′
•2).
Note, however, that a′•2 = b•2 and b
′
•2 = a•2. Therefore, h2(b•2) > h2(a•2), a
contradiction.
Proposition 2 Let  be an overall group deprivation ranking, which sat-
isfies invariance of matrix ranking to permutations of individuals and non-
invariance. Then  cannot be derived through any column-first two-stage
procedure based on (h1, ..., hm;cr) such that, for every j ∈ M, cr is posi-
tively responsive.
Proof. The proof of Proposition 2 is similar to Proposition 1 and we omit
it.
As noted earlier, since equity principle I, as well as equity principle II,
implies non-invariance, Propositions 3 and 4 below follow from Propositions
1 and 2.
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Proposition 3 Let  be a transitive overall group deprivation ranking,
which satisfies anonymity and either equity principle I or equity principle II.
Then  cannot be derived through any column-first two-stage procedure based
on (h1, ..., hm;cr) such that, for every j ∈M, cris positively responsive.
Proposition 4 Let  be an overall group deprivation ranking, which satis-
fies invariance of matrix ranking to permutations of individuals and either
equity principle I or equity principle II. Then  cannot be derived through
any column-first two-stage procedure based on (h1, ..., hm;cr) such that, for
every j ∈M, cris positively responsive.
Proposition 5 Let  be a transitive overall group deprivation ranking which
satisfies non-invariance. Then  cannot be derived through any column-first
two-stage procedure based on (h1, ..., hm;cr) such that, for every j ∈ M, hj
satisfies symmetry.
Proof. Let  be an OGDR satisfying non-invariance. Then there exist
A,A′ ∈ V, s, t ∈ N and j ∈ M such that a•k = a′•k for all k ∈ M − {j},
aij = a
′
ij for all i ∈ N − {s, t}, asj = a′tj and atj = a′sj, and not(A ∼ B).
By following a similar argument as in the proof for Proposition 1, it must
be true that (either A  A′ or A′  A). Without loss of generality, let
A  A′. Suppose to the contrary that  can be derived through some
column-first two-stage procedure based on (h1, ..., hm;cr), such that, for
every j ∈ M, hj satisfies symmetry. Since hj is symmetric, it must be true
that hj(a•j) = hj(a′•j). Note that a•k = a
′
•k for all k ∈ M − {j}. We then
obtain hk(a•k) = hk(a′•k) for all k ∈ M , which implies that A ∼ A′, which is
a contradiction.
Note that equity principle I, as well as equity principle II, are stronger
requirement than non-invariance. Proposition 5 therefore implies that
an OGDR which satisfies either equity principle I or equity principle II
cannot be derived through any column-first two-stage procedure based on
(h1, ..., hm;cr) such that, for every j ∈M, hj satisfies symmetry. It is, how-
ever, possible to prove the following result (Proposition 6), which is somewhat
stronger than this implication .
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Proposition 6 If a transitive overall group deprivation ranking satisfies ei-
ther equity principle I or equity principle II, then it cannot be derived through
any column-first two-stage procedure based on (h1, ..., hm;cr) such that, for
some j ∈M, hj satisfies symmetry.
Since the proof of Proposition 6 is similar to that of Proposition 5, we
omit it.
6 An extension
So far we have focussed on the problem of measuring deprivation. Our
analysis can, however, be readily extended to the measurement of living
standards more generally. To do this, one needs to interpret Rj as the set
of different levels of achievements in terms of attribute fj, a higher number
in Rj denoting a higher level of achievement with respect to attribute fj.
The requirement that Rj ⊆ [0, 1] was not drawn upon in our proofs and
can be laid aside. As before, we shall have n ×m matrices where each real
number figuring in the matrix indicates the level of achievement of some
individual i ∈ N in terms of some attribute fj . The binary relation 
defined over all such matrices will now be interpreted in terms of living
standards: for all standard of living matrices, A and A′, A  A′ will now
denote that A represents a higher standard of living for the society than
A′. The formal definitions of all the properties, excepting equity principles
I and II , will remain intact. Changes in the formal definitions of the two
equity principles are, however, necessary to retain the plausibility of the two
principles under the changed interpretation of . These changes are of the
most straightforward type possible, simply reflecting the fact that lower levels
of deprivation must be interpreted as higher levels of the living standard. The
two equity principles may now be reformulated as follows.
Equity Principle I (for comparing living standards):  satisfies equity
principle I for comparing living standards if and only if, for all A,B,C ∈ V ,
for all s, t ∈ N , and for all k ∈ M , if [(ai• = bi• = ci• for all i ∈ N −
{s, t}), (as• > at•, ask = atk, at• = bt•, and as• = cs•), and (as• and bs• are
k−variants, at• and ct• are k−variants, and bsk = ctk > ask = atk)], then
C  B.
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Equity Principle II (for comparing living standards):  satisfies
equity principle II for comparing living standards if and only if, for all A,B ∈
V , for all s, t ∈ N, and for some k ∈ M , if [(ai• = bi• for all i ∈ N − {s, t})
and (for all j ∈ M − {k}, asj = bsj > atj = btj and ask = btk > atk = bsk)],
then B  A.
It is evident that, given these revised versions of the two equity princi-
ples, the exact counterparts of Propositions 1 through 4 hold in the context
of standard of living comparisons. Thus, the force of the negative results
remains intact when we switch from the measurement of deprivation to the
measurement of living standards.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed a difficulty associated with a commonly
used procedure (the column-first two-stage procedure in our terminology)
for measuring a society’s deprivation or living standard. The difficulty lies in
its inherent inability to reconcile two highly plausible normative properties:
anonymity and non-invariance, that an overall indicator of a society’s depri-
vation or living standard may be required to have. Anonymity requires that,
in constructing such an overall indicator, individuals in a society should be
treated symmetrically. Non-invariance, on the other hand, imposes a require-
ment for the indicator to be equity-sensitive (in a minimal sense appropriate
to a multi-attribute context).
In an earlier paper, Dutta, Pattanaik and Xu (2003) showed that, under
some mild conditions, the column-first two-stage procedure and the row-first
two-stage procedure would not yield the same overall indicator except when
one used the sum,
∑
i∈N,j∈M aij, to rank alternative deprivation matrices. In
that paper, the authors assumed that the two procedures were undertaken
employing aggregation functions of a similar form. No such constraint has
been imposed in the current exercise.
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